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FAMILY LAW AND
THE NEW ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Rebecca Aviel*
INTRODUCTION
Civil litigation reform has so consistently and predictably benefitted a
certain set of defendants, at the expense of a certain set of plaintiffs, that it
has understandably come to be assumed antithetical to access-to-justice
values.1 The view, however, looks different in family court, where reformers
are implementing transformative changes that are consistent with access-tojustice values: these reforms are delivering dispute-resolution mechanisms
that are faster, cheaper, and easier to maneuver, particularly for selfrepresented litigants.2
This Article explores whether the optimistic prospect suggested by this
experience—of reform that promotes rather than inhibits access-to-justice
values—is inherently limited to family law. Does the experience with family
court reform offer insights that transfer to other contexts, or is family law
simply too exceptional? On the one hand, family law disputes are unique in
some truly important ways. It is difficult, for example, to conceive of a
convincing analogue for postdivorce parenting, and what we mean by
“justice” can be fundamentally different for domestic-relations litigants than
for others. On the other hand, reform in family court has been driven in part
by concerns about cost and speed that are hardly unique to domestic-relations
litigants. This Article suggests that some features of family court reform may
transfer to other contexts. Chief among these features is an emphasis on
triage rather than standardization as the touchstone of a fair and effective
specialized court.
This Article first sets out the view from family court, describing the
reforms that are taking root and arguing that they serve access-to-justice
values. It then assesses whether the core attributes of family law make the
field too exceptional for these reforms to have any transferable application to
* Associate Professor, Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship, University of Denver Sturm
College of Law. This Article was prepared for the Colloquium entitled Access to Justice and
the Legal Profession in an Era of Contracting Civil Liability, hosted by the Fordham Law
Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on October 27, 2017, at Fordham University
School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants
from the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1537 (2016) (describing a series of substantive
and procedural developments that “have erected near-impossible obstacles in the path to the
courthouse for economically disadvantaged groups”).
2. See infra Part I.
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other contexts. Having established that domestic-relations litigants and the
institutions that serve them are concerned about reducing cost and increasing
speed, this Article observes that these objectives no doubt transfer to other
contexts, and so it is worth focusing on some of the essential qualities that
family court reformers have used to balance efficiency and individualized
justice.
I. THE VIEW FROM FAMILY COURT
Family law has undergone a pronounced turn away from formal
adversarial procedure that is well documented in the academic literature.3
For policymakers, judges, administrators, and other professionals working in
domestic relations, the consensus that adversarial resolution of family issues
is best avoided can hardly be overstated,4 and the ongoing effort to focus on
problem-solving models with a therapeutic orientation is robust.5
Nonetheless, to assist with the overarching goal of assessing whether family
court reform might provide insight for other contexts, it is useful to begin
with a brief sketch of how far family law has come over the last fifty years to
arrive at this juncture.
To truly appreciate the current vantage point, it is essential to remember
that until the so-called “no fault revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s, divorce
was only available to an “innocent” spouse who could prove that his or her
partner had committed a specific type of misconduct—such as adultery,
cruelty, or abandonment—and was therefore at fault for breach of the marital
contract.6 Divorce was inescapably adversarial: spouses were not
encouraged to work together to end their marriage in a collaborative way and

3. See, e.g., Rebecca Aviel, Counsel for the Divorce, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1099, 1111 (2014)
(“The traditional model of full-fledged, individualized partisan advocacy has all but become
obsolete for family law cases—unaffordable for most couples and unattractive for many
more.”); Barbara A. Babb, Reevaluating Where We Stand: A Comprehensive Survey of
America’s Family Justice Systems, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 230, 230 (2008) (“Court reform relative
to family law matters has risen steadily over the past decade. States have restructured their
justice systems to handle increasingly complex family law cases and burgeoning family law
caseloads.”).
4. See generally Aviel, supra note 3; Babb, supra note 3; Jane C. Murphy & Jana B.
Singer, Moving Family Dispute Resolution from the Court System to the Community, 75 MD.
L. REV. ENDNOTES 9 (2016). As captured in one pithy summary, “Everyone who works in
family law . . . agrees on two things: family court is not good for families, and litigation is not
good for children.” Michael Saini, Triage as an Innovative Framework for Domestic Relations
Cases, Presentation at Modern Families, Innovative Courts: The 2015 Domestic Relations
Best Practice Court Institute for Judges, Magistrates, Family Court Facilitators and Sherlocks
(June 1–3, 2015) (PowerPoint on file with author).
5. See, e.g., Murphy & Singer, supra note 4, at 9 (“Mediation, collaboration, and other
non-adversarial processes have replaced a traditional, law-oriented adversarial regime.”).
6. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 142–45 (3d ed. 2005); id. at
145 (“[Fault-based divorce was] an adversary proceeding. An innocent and virtuous spouse
sued an evil or neglectful partner. The defendant had to be at fault; there had to be ‘grounds’
for the divorce.”).
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were in fact prohibited from doing so.7 As difficult as it may be to imagine
now, such cooperation was treated as collusive and a fraud on the court.8
A much-needed corrective arrived in the form of no-fault divorce, which
allowed spouses to divorce upon a showing of “irreconcilable differences”9
or the “irretrievable breakdown”10 of their marriage, but this reform was only
a partial response. For well after the advent of no-fault divorce, family court
still operated on the premise that divorce would unfold in much the same way
as other civil litigation: each party would be represented by a capable lawyer,
the parties would engage in discovery, motions would be filed and hearings
would be held, and, after a trial in which evidence was proffered and legal
arguments presented, a judge would issue an order dissolving the marriage
and resolving the attendant financial and child-related issues.11 Even if the
couple were in agreement that the marriage should end, and were permitted
by the innovation of no-fault divorce to openly proceed in that joint endeavor,
there were still multiple avenues to press for advantage, using all the
procedures and techniques of adversarial litigation.12 Commentators have
thus suggested that no-fault divorce did not eliminate the rancor or hostility
from divorce proceedings but merely shifted it from the dissolution itself to
the collateral issues of property distribution, spousal support, child support,
and child custody.13
Family court reformers, to their credit, have resisted the conclusion that
such hostility is an unavoidable feature of any system that involves divorcing
spouses.14 Rather than assuming that divorcing spouses bring with them to
7. Id. at 145.
8. See Fuchs v. Fuchs, 64 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488–89 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (noting that “a party
cannot consent to the entry of a decree of divorce” because of the “well known vigilance of
the courts to prevent collusion, and because of the general interest of the people of the state in
the preservation of the matrimonial status of its citizens”); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 6,
at 145 (“The law insisted that divorce by mutual consent was wrongful and impossible.”).
9. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2400(a)(2) (West 2015).
10. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-110 (2016).
11. See Alan H. Frank et al., No Fault Divorce and the Divorce Rate: The Nebraska
Experience—an Interrupted Time Series Analysis and Commentary, 58 NEB. L. REV. 1, 49
(1978) (suggesting that even after many states began to embrace the no-fault system, the
practice of family law remained largely the same for several years). One notable difference,
however, with ramifications that extend well beyond professional ethics, is the prohibition on
contingency-fee arrangements in domestic-relations cases. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
12. See Frank et al., supra note 11, at 49–51.
13. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 579–80; Frank et al., supra note 11, at 50–51.
14. See, e.g., LOGAN CORNETT ET AL., OUT OF COURT AND IN COLLABORATION:
EVALUATING A NEW MODEL FOR SEPARATION AND DIVORCE IN A UNIVERSITY SETTING 1
(2016), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/rcsdf_out_of_court_and
_in_collaboration.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y96T-VC34] (“Even when families intend to divorce
with dignity, integrity, and support for their children, the structure of the court system is often
at odds with that approach. Court processes continue to emphasize traditional civil
adjudication in family cases, which naturally places parents in the position of adversaries.”);
NATALIE ANNE KNOWLTON, STEWARDS OF THE SYSTEM, LEADERS OF CHANGE 4–5 (2016),
http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/the_family_law_bar_stewards_
of_the_system_leaders_of_change.pdf [https://perma.cc/RN6N-E4SP]; Andrew Schepard et
al., The Family Law Bar, the Interdisciplinary Resource Center for Separating and Divorcing
Parents, and the “Spark to Kindle the White Flame of Progress,” 55 FAM. CT. REV. 84, 89
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family court some static, predetermined level of conflict to which the system
passively responds, reformers have internalized the premise that the system
itself can either heighten or reduce conflict, and family court processes
should be designed with this in mind.15 While it might seem inevitable, for
example, that divorcing spouses will be adverse to one another on what
appear to be zero-sum financial matters, the transaction costs of proceeding
in an adverse posture can quickly overtake whatever financial gains might
result from litigating to the hilt. A sophisticated system will help divorcing
spouses see and avoid these costs, offering them the infrastructure to
recognize the shared gains to be had from cooperation.16 And yet, for
families struggling with substance abuse, violence, mental health concerns,
and other chronic challenges, it may be inappropriate to expect or encourage
cooperation.17 The ongoing challenge for family court reformers, then, has
been to design systems and processes that do not exacerbate family conflict
but do not ignore it, either, and instead offer individualized responses in the
face of persistent resource constraints.
In jurisdictions that have moved the furthest toward this goal, families
coming to court for the resolution of domestic-relations matters encounter a
multistream system that endeavors to tailor the level of procedural intricacy
to the degree of conflict and complexity presented by their particular
circumstances, a concept sometimes described as “differentiated case
management.”18 Such systems encourage simplification where possible, rely
heavily on the expertise of nonlegal professionals to provide both diagnostic
and therapeutic services, and offer a dynamic rather than lockstep process.19
These systems are managed by court officials and constantly respond to
developments in the earlier stages of a given case.20 This Part explores some
of the specific innovations that one might see in such jurisdictions and then
considers whether they can be characterized as access-to-justice reforms.

(2017) (“Many parents want and benefit from a model of legal service delivery that emphasizes
problem solving and what unites—rather than divides—them. . . . Rather than assuming the
parties will be positioned as adversaries, . . . lawyers and the system should help the parties
work together.”).
15. See generally CORNETT ET AL., supra note 14; KNOWLTON, supra note 14; Schepard et
al., supra note 14.
16. See Saini, supra note 4.
17. Scholars and advocates have long debated whether mediation, for example, is
appropriate in situations involving domestic violence. See generally Susan Landrum, The
Ongoing Debate About Mediation in the Context of Domestic Violence: A Call for Empirical
Studies of Mediation Effectiveness, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 425 (2011) (describing a
range of different views and gathering sources).
18. ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY
MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 113 (2004).
19. Id. at 114.
20. Id. at 113–14.
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A. Innovations in Modern Divorce
1. Simplified Dissolution
“Simplified,” “summary,” or “expedited” dissolution allows a couple who
meets certain eligibility requirements to convert their agreement into a formal
divorce decree with minimal time and process, sometimes without even
appearing in court.21 The states that have incorporated such an option into
their domestic-relations framework differ as to the particulars, but a few
commonalities are apparent.22 The basic concept is to set forth a relatively
concrete set of criteria that the couple must satisfy in addition to presenting
the court with a full agreement as to all collateral issues.23 These criteria tend
to consist of limits on, for example, the length of time the couple has been
married, the amount of property or debt the couple has jointly and
individually owned or incurred, and whether the couple has children.24 These
criteria, although straightforward enough for many couples to apply to their
own circumstances without a lawyer, simultaneously reflect some of family
law’s most enduring and foundational principles: the idea that a couple’s
financial entanglements and mutual dependence grow over time, such that a
longer marriage is more difficult to unwind;25 that courts have an
independent obligation to vigorously scrutinize parental agreements,
ensuring that the best interests of children are considered;26 and that property
acquired during marriage, with certain exclusions, is marital and thus subject
to equitable distribution upon divorce.27
Simplified dissolution options thus reflect a nuanced balance between the
couple’s interest in being the masters of their own separation agreement, as
21. See Hon. Lynda B. Munro (Ret.) et al., Administrative Divorce Trends and
Implications, 50 FAM. L.Q. 427, 428 (2016) (describing summary dissolution as offering
couples “a more efficient, less public, and more cost-effective dissolution of their marriage”).
For an early overview of simplified dissolution, see Anne M. Eggers, Summary Dissolution
and Uncontested Pro Se Representation: Viable Alternatives in the Divorce Dilemma, 12
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 285, 285 (1991).
22. See generally Munro et al., supra note 21 (comparing the summary dissolution
procedures of several different states). The states that have adopted a form of summary
dissolution include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, California, Connecticut, Oregon, Illinois,
Indiana, Montana, Florida, New York, and Minnesota. Id. at 433–34.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 435–40.
25. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (alternatives
A and B) (instructing courts to consider the duration of the marriage in making property
determinations).
26. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(7) (2016) (instructing that proposed parenting
plans must be submitted to the court for approval).
27. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2002). While some of the American Law
Institute’s principles are more reformist in nature rather than a reflection of the existing state
of the law, section 4.03’s definition of “marital property” does reflect the approach taken in
most jurisdictions. JUDITH AREEN ET AL., FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1025 (6th ed.
2012). While couples can, of course, agree to unwind their finances in ways that diverge from
the “fruit of marital labor” principle, we might think that where the assets are substantial, it is
important that rights be waived in a fully informed and deliberative posture that is not available
without a hearing.
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quickly and cheaply as possible, and the state’s interest in ensuring that the
agreement has received an appropriate level of review, roughly calibrated to
the interests at stake. As with any such effort to balance competing goals, it
is not perfect.28 But neither is it mandatory, and both parties have to agree
to participate in order to proceed.29 For those who value speed, the upside is
clear: a decree in a fraction of the time, and at a fraction of the cost, that it
would take to proceed through the standard sequence. In Minnesota, for
example, a simplified dissolution takes thirty days as compared to the twelvemonth period that characterizes the vast majority of nonsimplified cases.30
Simplified dissolution, however, is about more than just speed, lowering
costs, or reducing the inconvenience of appearing in court. For those couples
who qualify, it is a chance to choose a minimalist role for the state in the
dissolution of their marriage.31 As captured by one judge discussing the
importance of offering a simplified dissolution procedure, when it comes to
couples who want and are eligible for it, “we need to get out of their way.”32
The opportunity to weaken the state’s monopoly over divorce should be
recognized as an access-to-justice value.33

28. As one group of commentators observes,
With no judicial review, one or both of the parties may end up with a result that is
unfair or inequitable and with no remedy. Rather, the parties will be left to their
own devices and may find themselves with an agreement that sounded fair at the
time that they signed, but in reality leaves one party with significantly more assets
than the other . . . .
Moreover, without the discovery process, where the parties have the right to
obtain each other’s financial documents—including tax returns, bank statements,
credit card statements, pay stubs, insurance policies, appraisals of any assets, and
the like—there is no way to ensure that each party has an accurate and complete
understanding of all of the assets and liabilities in their marital estate.
Munro et al., supra note 21, at 442. Note that some of these difficulties are resolvable—
Illinois, for example, requires that couples seeking expedited divorce “have disclosed to each
other all assets and liabilities and their tax returns for all years of the marriage.” 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/452(i) (2016).
29. Munro et al., supra note 21, at 433.
30. MINN. STAT. § 518.195(2) (2017) (“The district court administrator shall enter a decree
of dissolution 30 days after the filing of the joint declaration if the parties meet the statutory
qualifications and have complied with the procedural requirements of this subdivision.”).
Over 98 percent of dissolutions, with or without children involved, were disposed of within
twenty-four months. See COURT SERVS. DIV., MINN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, PERFORMANCE
MEASURES: KEY RESULTS AND MEASURES 5 (2015), http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/
media/CIOMediaLibrary/Documents/Annual-Report-2015-Perf-Measures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EKN2-CUZ3]. Of that percentage, 94 percent were resolved in twelve
months. Id. at 16.
31. This minimalism can be thought of as an antidote for the interventionism and
excessive displays of state power that many litigants encounter in family court. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts, 22 GEO.
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 473, 503 (2015) (“Lecturing and chiding litigants, typical of
problem-solving court judges, infantilizes litigants and reinforces notions that low-income
people appearing before the court are childish and in need of state supervision.”).
32. Judge Randall Arp, Chair, Colo. Supreme Court Standing Comm. on Family Issues,
Remarks at Meeting of the Colorado Supreme Court Standing Committee on Family Issues
(Apr. 21, 2017).
33. The Supreme Court’s discussion of the state monopoly over divorce nearly fifty years
ago is still surprisingly apt:
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2. Mediation Improved: Early Neutral Assessment
Families whose circumstances make them ineligible for summary
dissolution may nonetheless be able to resolve their dispute without trial if
they have access to other alternatives, and mediation is one that has become
well established in family court.34 It has a strong track record in reducing
costs while increasing litigant satisfaction but has also been plagued by some
recognized shortcomings.35 One of the improvements that has been
particularly promising is “early neutral assessment” (ENA), also described as
“early neutral evaluation” (ENE), in which a neutral third party with
substantive experience in the field gives the parties “a confidential opinion
regarding the likely outcome of the case and an analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of each side’s arguments.”36
ENA is a voluntary, opt-in process that builds on two crucial insights about
assisting families in dissolution. First, that dissolution, like many other
processes, is characterized by path dependence—that what happens in the
early stages of a divorce dictates and limits subsequent developments.37 It
therefore is not enough to offer (or even require) mediation in an effort to
divert cases from trial; to optimize the chances for success, parties must enter
mediation before they have dug in on their respective positions. The second
key insight underpinning ENA is that divorcing couples need more than just
passive facilitation to arrive at a fair and effective agreement: they need
information and context to guide their negotiation.38 By offering the couple
not only facilitation but also substantive assessment, ENA provides the
[W]e are unaware of any jurisdiction where private citizens may covenant for or
dissolve marriages without state approval. Even where all substantive requirements
are concededly met, we know of no instance where two consenting adults may
divorce and mutually liberate themselves from the constraints of legal obligations
that go with marriage, and more fundamentally the prohibition against remarriage,
without invoking the State’s judicial machinery.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
34. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy & Robert Rubinson, Domestic Violence and Mediation:
Responding to the Challenges of Crafting Effective Screens, 39 FAM. L.Q. 53, 53 (2005)
(noting that mediation of family law cases has become well established in American courts).
35. Critiques of mediation include concerns that it is “rushed and mechanical.” Rebecca
Love Kourlis et al., Courts and Communities Helping Families in Transition Arising from
Separation or Divorce, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 351, 364 (2013).
36. Jordan Leigh Santeramo, Note, Early Neutral Evaluation in Divorce Cases, 42 FAM.
CT. REV. 321, 321, 325 (2004). The ENE program adopted in Hennepin County, Minnesota,
was named by the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation at the Harvard
Kennedy School of Government as one of the “Top 50 Government Innovations” in 2009.
Early Case Management/Early Neutral Evaluation, MINN. JUD. BRANCH,
http://www.mncourts.gov/Help-Topics/ENE-ECM.aspx [https://perma.cc/LZ7H-2M3R] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2018).
37. See Oona Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604 (2001) (“‘[P]ath dependence’
means that an outcome or decision is shaped in specific and systematic ways by the historical
path leading to it. It entails, in other words, a causal relationship between stages in a temporal
sequence, with each stage strongly influencing the direction of the following stage.”).
38. See Aviel, supra note 3, at 1113–16 (explaining that mediation involves the waiver of
significant rights and that it is essential that parties are provided with sufficient guidance to
make “reasonably informed decisions”).
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objective criteria that negotiation theorists have long instructed is a crucial
element of “getting to yes.”39
As with simplified dissolution, the details of ENA programs can vary from
one jurisdiction to the next. In the Colorado jurisdictions that offer ENA, a
team is comprised of one lawyer and one mental health professional, one of
whom is male and one of whom is female.40 The lawyer is available to
answer questions about the governing legal framework;41 the mental health
professional offers insight about child development, attachment theory, and
other concepts important for separating parents to understand.42 After
hearing from the parties, the ENA team will then give an assessment of what,
in their professional view, is in the interests of the child (or children) for
whom parenting responsibilities are being determined and what is likely to
occur if a judge were to rule on the case.43 The premise is that the ensuing
negotiation will be more successful if each parent has been assisted in
developing a realistic expectation and has had some expert guidance
developing child-centered terms.44 With this foundation, parties can resolve
their entire parenting-time dispute in a period of three to four hours, including
the assessment, the negotiation, and the conversion of their agreement into a
decree.45 As one judge explains, parties can walk into the courthouse for
their ENA session, negotiate a fully comprehensive parenting-time
agreement—complete with holidays, transportation issues, and the like—and
walk out of the courthouse with a permanent order.46 It is essential to
emphasize the significance of what might seem like a trivial detail—for
working parents juggling an array of competing demands during a highly
stressful period, access to justice means less rather than more time in court.47
39. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING
IN 82–93 (2011).
40. Early Neutral Assessment, COLO. JUD. DEP’T, https://www.courts.state.co.us/
userfiles/file/Court_Probation/08th_Judicial_District/Larimer/ENA%20Info%20Sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4RWH-PPCF] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). Minnesota also requires that
ENA teams for parenting determinations be comprised of one male member and one female
member but does not specify the professional training of the team other than to state that
“[e]valuators must be seasoned professionals, able to screen for domestic violence, able to
gather relevant information efficiently, and able to ascertain the merits and weaknesses of each
party’s case quickly.” Minn. Judicial Council, Minn. Judicial Branch, Minnesota Early Case
Management (ECM) and Early Neutral Evaluation (ENE) Best Practices for Family Court 9
(July 1, 2012), http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/scao_library/ENE/ECMENE_Statewide_Best_Practices_520-1_(final_5-17-12).pdf
[https://perma.cc/5VQ6QXKM].
41. See Early Neutral Assessment, supra note 40.
42. Id. Notably, parties can choose ENA whether they are counseled or self-represented.
Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Cojudicial, Early Neutral Assessment, YOUTUBE (Feb. 14, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4vQuj6IYzI [https://perma.cc/E5DG-4S5K].
46. Id. (predicting that postdecree modification motions will be much reduced for ENAresolved cases).
47. See Richard Zorza, Some First Thoughts on Court Simplification: The Key to Civil
Access and Justice Transformation, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 845, 859 (2013) (noting that “[f]or poor
and middle-income people, each hearing or step may represent lost wages, or even the threat
of a lost job, as well as incidental travel and childcare expenses”); see also Rebecca Aviel,
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3. The Importance of Screening and Triage
In evaluating whether these new programs promote or inhibit access-to
justice values, it is important to understand that they are simply not suitable
for all families, and they are not offered with the expectation that every
family will participate. In fact, the predicate is the opposite—that the
programs only work when matched with families that can benefit from them
and that one of the most important functions court staff can perform is the
effective sorting necessary to achieve this match.48 Screening and triage thus
compose the fulcrum upon which family court reform rests.
Family court reformers have learned the importance of screening and
triage from experience. The current orientation toward triage represents an
evolution from an approach to family court management that could be
described as a tiered regime, in which all families move through a sequential
phase of services and resolution efforts, supposedly on an increasing
spectrum from the least to most intrusive, that escalates to the final stage of
litigation where necessary.49 Although similarly motivated by the principle
that adversarial litigation of family disputes, especially those involving
children, is a last resort to be avoided wherever possible, the tiered approach
is different from a triage approach in some important ways.50 The former is
“one-size-fits-all” in the sense that each family moves on the same track, with
the effect of shepherding higher-conflict families through interventions that
are virtually certain to fail before providing more specialized services tailored
to their level of conflict and complexity.51 Not only is this a waste of
resources for the system, but, for the high-conflict families in this category,
the lock-step approach slows down their progress toward a final disposition
and may even pose risks to their safety. One of the key principles of
domestic-relations triage is that families should not undergo services that will
not help them; that they should not participate in processes, however salutary

Why Civil Gideon Won’t Fix Family Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2106, 2109 (2013) (noting that in
family court, “[m]ost litigants want proceedings that are shorter, simpler, cheaper, more
personal, more collaborative, and less adversarial”).
48. See Peter Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The Beginning
of the End for Mandatory Mediation?, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 371, 383–84 (2009).
49. Id. at 372–76. One visual metaphor for this is a staircase: the lowest stair represents
services that one might get before even filing an action, such as information available on a
website explaining the dissolution process; the middle stairs reflect court intake and mediation;
and the top of the staircase represents litigation. See Saini, supra note 4.
50. The National Center for State Courts describes the tiered approach as follows:
Many courts process divorce cases linearly, each case moving through the same set
of prescribed steps. In this model, families are presented with a tiered set of services
that specify how a case will move from initial contact with the court through
progressively more intrusive and directive services and proceedings. This approach
burdens those where both sides are largely in agreement and just want to have the
case resolved in timely fashion, while siphoning resources away from families that
may truly benefit from enhanced services.
The High Performance Court and Divorce Case Triage, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.,
http://www.ncsc.org/services-and-experts/areas-of-expertise/children-and-families/divorcecase-triage.aspx [https://perma.cc/H58J-WVUY] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
51. See id.
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in the abstract, that have no realistic prospect of resolving their dispute.52
Correspondingly, under a triage approach, judicial involvement is not
withheld until other services have failed; rather, families that require judicial
intervention are understood to need it as soon as possible.53
Against this backdrop, family court triage can be understood as an effort
to sort litigants by the degree of conflict and complexity presented by their
circumstances, with the goal of tailoring court processes accordingly and
providing appropriate services as soon as possible.54 As the graphic55 below
suggests, conflict and complexity are distinct concepts and occur
independently:

The conflict element is somewhat intuitive as a feature of divorce cases,
which involve the dissolution of the most intimate of human relationships.
Complexity, on the other hand, might stem from any number of variables in
a domestic-relations case, such as marital assets that are difficult to value or
partition, prospective relocation for one of the parents, or immigration
consequences attendant to the custodial determination.56 The presence of
either conflict or complexity is likely to drive up the degree of resources
necessary to bring a case to resolution, and an effective triage system will
have ways of identifying which cases present these features such that litigants
can be matched with the appropriate services.57
52. Triage might, therefore, mean the end of mandatory mediation. See generally Salem,
supra note 48.
53. See id. at 380–81.
54. Kara Martin, Colo. Domestic Relations Triage Project, Presentation at Meeting of the
Colorado Supreme Court Standing Committee on Family Issues (Apr. 21, 2017) (PowerPoint
on file with the author).
55. Id. Alicia Davis of the Nation Center for State Courts granted permission to use this
graphic.
56. Id.
57. Another expert offers a typology of five different groups of family court litigants, in
increasing order of conflict, complexity, and therefore, need. Saini, supra note 4. At one end
of the spectrum are the “stampers,” who have reached an agreement but need the court to
formalize and incorporate it into a decree. Id. At the other end are the “intractables”—parties
who are severely entrenched in dispute or who exhibit several risk factors for prolonged
conflict, and therefore need specialized services to help them arrive at resolution. Id. In the
middle, we have the “contemplators,” the “nudgers,” and the “entrenchables,” representing
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This tailoring is operationalized through intake procedures that seek to
elicit from litigants the specific types of information that court staff will need
to assess the level of complexity, conflict, and need.58 These screening
instruments might attempt to discern whether the case presents domestic
violence concerns, whether there are pending criminal cases or civil
protection orders, whether one of the parties has drained assets from mutual
accounts, or whether one spouse has otherwise prevented the other from
accessing funds.59 They might also seek information about disability or
immigration status.60 Screening tools vary by jurisdiction—Alaska’s
screening instrument, for example, elicits information about potential tribal
court jurisdiction that would not need to be front and center for family courts
in other states.61 In some jurisdictions, triage is practiced informally, by
individual court administrators bringing to bear their own experiences
managing family court dockets.62 The practices are widely understood to be
essential to the effective management of the system but are not
institutionalized or systematized.63
It should be understood that in all of their varied forms, the screening
instruments are not simply ministerial, record-gathering exercises. They are
the product of decades of experience with domestic-relations litigants as well
as input from mental health experts and advocates for domestic violence
survivors, and they are constantly being discussed, evaluated, and refined.
The efficacy of these tools is, of course, an ever-present concern.

varying degrees of complexity and conflict, requiring different types of assistance from court
staff to resolve their disputes. Id.
58. See BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., THE HIGH PERFORMANCE COURT AND DIVORCE CASE
TRIAGE 6–10 (2014), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Services%20and%20Experts/
Areas%20of%20expertise/Children%20Families/The-HPC-and-Divorce-Case-Triage-FinalReport-12312014.ashx [https://perma.cc/CS3H-PC5F] (describing how researchers surveyed
existing screening instruments).
59. See, e.g., id. at 9; Colo. Domestic Relations Triage Project, Triage Tools Currently
Used, Presentation at Colorado Domestic Relations Triage Project Workshop (Dec. 1, 2016)
(on file with author) (compiling and reviewing existing screening tools used in Connecticut,
Alaska, Nebraska, Colorado, Arizona, and Florida).
60. See, e.g., OSTROM ET AL., supra note 58, at 9.
61. See Kara Martin, Colo. Courts, Alicia Davis, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Exploration
of a Systematized Triage Approach, Presentation at Colorado Domestic Relations Triage
Project Workshop (Dec. 1, 2016) (on file with author). In determining whether a case might
be inappropriate for its early resolution program, Alaska’s screening instrument seeks to elicit
particular information, such as whether there is a tribal court custody case pending; whether
there is any dispute about jurisdiction (either as between state court jurisdictions or between
state and tribal court); whether there are complicated financial determinations that must be
made, such as the ownership of a business that must be partitioned; and whether there is a
third-party request for custody from a grandparent or other relative or an assertion by a
nonparent that he or she has been functioning as a parent and is the child’s psychological
parent. Id.
62. Id.
63. State court administrators in Colorado gave a presentation providing an overview of
domestic-relations triage practices throughout the state, highlighting some of the challenges
faced in each jurisdiction. For one sparsely populated district in the state’s mountain west
region, one of the chief problems identified was that there was only “one Mary, one Laurie.”
Id.
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Fortunately, as the next Part explains, family law contains within it one of
the best possible ways of testing whether a triage system is actually working.
4. Happily Divorced?: Metrics for Judging Performance
Any overview of innovation in family court needs to grapple with the
question of evaluation: how do we know whether these programs are
working? This, in turn, breaks down into (at least) two related questions:
(1) how do we define success and (2) how do we measure for it? Although
these questions require more attention than can be given here, this Article
briefly discusses two very different ways we might judge performance and
then hones in on one particularly important metric.
The first approach for judging performance focuses on the subjective
perceptions of individual participants: whether they feel they were treated
fairly, had a chance to be heard, and received the information they needed to
make progress in the resolution of their case. As summarized by the National
Center for State Courts, an institutional leader in the field of domesticrelations triage, “This measure evaluates the extent to which the court is seen
by its customers to demonstrate fairness, respect, equal treatment, and
concern.”64
The second approach focuses on quantitative, system-wide measures of
effective case processing, which might include a court’s clearance rate
(defined as the number of incoming cases as a percentage of outgoing cases),
the age of pending cases, or the average time from filing to disposition.65
These metrics help us understand whether courts are managing their dockets
effectively and sustainably.
Both subjective and systemic evaluations of family court programs are
essential components of any comprehensive evaluation effort, and reformers
and administrators are pursuing them assiduously.66 There is, however, one
exceptionally important metric that bridges these two types of information
and offers insight as to both litigant satisfaction and systemic improvement.
This metric is the number and timing of postdecree motions filed in a
particular case or in a particular jurisdiction. Understanding why this metric
is so important is very simple: when families are not happily divorced, they
will say so. They will be back in court, presenting either old issues that were
not really resolved by the previous disposition or new issues that have
emerged from a postdivorce arrangement that is not working.67
64. Giving Courts the Tools to Measure Success, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. (2017),
http://www.courtools.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CourTools/CourToolsOnline-Final.ashx
[https://perma.cc/MVB2-VMVW].
65. See Roger Hanson et al., The Pursuit of High Performance, INT’L J. FOR CT. ADMIN.,
Nov. 2010, at 1, 6.
66. See, e.g., BRIAN OSTROM & ROGER HANSON, ACHIEVING HIGH PERFORMANCE: A
FRAMEWORK FOR COURTS 41 (2010), https://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/
ctadmin/id/1874 [https://perma.cc/HD6K-M7RQ] (describing the need to measure both
customer satisfaction and institutional efficiency and productivity).
67. The doctrinal foundation for this is a bit more complicated. Essentially, custody orders
are not considered final judgments because of the importance of allowing courts to exercise
continuing jurisdiction over matters such as child custody and support. See Rebecca Aviel, A
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That is why, when the programs described above are being reviewed for
efficacy, the evaluations do not just examine the time it takes to bring a case
to decree—although that is an important metric, it would not capture whether
families are being herded into arrangements that do not really meet their
needs. The evaluations also track the number of postdecree motions that are
filed in the first two years after the decree, as this is a revealing test of whether
a family’s custodial and financial issues were comprehensively and
meaningfully resolved in ways that will endure beyond the decree.
The early returns for this most important indicator of success are very
good, and I offer here one example. When a jurisdiction in Alaska
implemented and then evaluated an early resolution program, a study
compared 299 cases that were resolved using the new program to a control
group of randomly selected divorce and custody cases that were resolved
during a two-year period before the program was implemented.68
Importantly, because the control group was comprised of randomly selected
cases that were resolved before the new program was available, the study was
not distorted by the selection effect of having the most potentially
cooperative families pulled out of the sample.69 Reviewing the results, it is
notable that the cases from the early resolution program were resolved three
to four times faster than the control-group cases.70 But what is truly
significant was that there was no material difference in the number of
modification motions filed within the first two years after the decree.71 Thus,
the speed with which the early resolution program allowed participants to
resolve their cases came at no cost to the long-term viability of the
arrangements to which they agreed.
The upshot of the foregoing is that the resolution of family disputes used
to resemble other forms of civil litigation but is now undergoing a quiet
transformation—a series of small changes that together are significant. In
the Part section, this Article considers whether these reforms promote accessto-justice values.
B. An Access-to-Justice Movement?
There is no single universally accepted definition of “access to justice,”
and there is robust debate about what it means, both in the scholarly literature
and among the reformers and advocates who work on access-to-justice
initiatives.72 At its core, the concern has always been the inability of low-

New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2003, 2028–29 (2014) (explaining
that the court must be able to revisit custody disputes as necessary to protect the interests of
the children involved).
68. Martin & Davis, supra note 61.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. One commenter objects to the very term, asserting that it is “amorphous” and
distracting to talk about “justice” when what someone really wants, for example, is a will. Dan
Lear, Lawyers Need to Move to Beyond ‘Access to Justice’ to Close the Legal Services Gap,
A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1, 2015, 8:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/lawyers

2292

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

and middle-income Americans to afford counsel for civil legal problems and
the resulting “pro se crisis” that is overwhelming civil courts.73 The concept
has expanded beyond legal representation to encompass a much broader
range of strategies to meet the needs of people who cannot afford counsel,74
an innovation born in part of necessity. As one scholar has observed, a
relentless series of defeats for the idea of a civil right to counsel has
necessitated other solutions.75 She goes on to articulate a vision for “demand
side reform,” describing “an overhaul of the processes and rules that govern
litigation so that they best serve the interests of the overwhelming majority
of customers in the lower state courts—the unrepresented.”76 In a similar
vein, others have argued that simplification of court processes is an essential
component of any meaningful access-to-justice movement.77
As the foregoing descriptions suggest, the innovations in family court are
consistent with these concepts of access to justice: if there are not enough
lawyers to work the system, then we will change the system so that it relies
less on lawyers. But there is something essential missing from that
characterization. The new family court was not developed in begrudging
acceptance of the reality that a civil right to counsel was never going to
materialize; it was envisioned as the best way to handle family disputes. In
fact, one of the great ironies of family dispute-resolution reform is that the
turn toward problem-solving mechanisms and away from adversarial
litigation has been most successful for families with means.78 This dynamic
_need_to_move_beyond_access_to_justice_to_close_the_legal_services_g [https://perma.cc/
5RB9-7R9Z].
73. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap for Reform, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1227, 1228 (2014) (noting that “[o]ver four-fifths of the poor’s legal needs and two- to threefifths of the legal needs of middle-income Americans remain unmet”). See generally Aviel,
supra note 47 (compiling sources that address the inability of many civil litigants to afford
counsel for serious legal problems). A broader concept includes the sort of phenomena
described by Professor Arthur Miller, marking a “retreat from the principles of citizen access,
private enforcement of public policies, and equality of litigant treatment in favor of corporate
interests and concentrated wealth.” Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A
Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2010).
74. These include unbundled delivery of legal services, self-help centers, the development
of forms that guide litigants to provide those facts that will be legally relevant to the resolution
of their dispute, and the deployment of inquisitorial judicial practices. See generally Jessica
K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An Empirical Look at a Problem-Solving
Housing Court, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1058 (2017).
75. See Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN.
L. REV. 741, 746 (2015).
76. Id. (“Effective demand side reform would revise the procedural and evidentiary rules
that commonly cause pro se litigants to stumble and require judges to develop facts that
support established claims and defenses, thus enabling meaningful participation in the court
system by those who appear without counsel.”).
77. See, e.g., Zorza, supra note 47, at 847–50. In fact, the Center on Court Access to
Justice for All has an entire section of its website devoted to the concept that simplification is
an access-to-justice principle. Ctr. on Court Access to Justice for All, Rule and Process
Simplification, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/microsites/access-tojustice/home/Topics/Rule-and-Process-Simplification.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z9DF-AME2].
But see MacDowell, supra note 31, at 498 (critiquing “informalism” and “delegalization” in
family court).
78. As two commentators note:
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offers a twist on Benjamin Barton’s exhortation to imagine a legal system
that so effectively serves the interests of poor people that it becomes the envy
of the rich.79
The Center for Out-of-Court Divorce (COCD) in Denver, Colorado,
illuminates some of these themes. It started at the University of Denver,
subsidized and operated in the model of clinical education, and then after two
years transitioned to a free-standing center with the intent to become
financially self-sustaining.80 Families paid a flat rate for a suite of services
that included counseling, access to support groups, financial planning, legal
education, mediation of parenting plans and financial issues, and the drafting
of documents necessary to formalize the resulting agreements.81 Couples
could choose to have the final hearing, during which their agreements would
be converted to a decree, at the COCD instead of in court.82 Most COCD
If disputing families have money, they can choose when and how much the court
will be involved in their break up and reorganization. Family lawyers now offer
clients a range of options for resolving disputes relating to separation and divorce.
Given these options, well-resourced parties increasingly choose out-of-court
processes such as mediation, negotiation, and collaborative practice to resolve their
conflicts without resorting to court involvement—thus reducing the acrimony and
avoiding the loss of control and privacy that result from extended court proceedings.
Murphy & Singer, supra note 4, at 9–10.
79. “[I]magine a world where there are special courts that are set up for the poor that
operate so well that they are the envy of the wealthy, who are still using a lawyer-driven model
that persists from 17th Century England.” Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for
Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1273–74 (2010).
80. Unfortunately, this business model has presented some unforeseen challenges, and the
COCD has had to suspend operations while “changes and refinements are researched that
could ensure fiscal stability for a next version of the out-of-court model.” Emily Hastings,
CODC Ceasing Operations as of November 20, 2017, CTR. FOR OUT-OF-CT. DIVORCE (Nov.
13, 2017), http://centerforoutofcourtdivorce.org/blog/cocd-ceasing-operations-november-202017/ [https://perma.cc/JE5K-TE8J]. While this highlights the importance of financial
viability in developing alternative service models for divorcing families, it does not detract
from the observations offered here about the extent to which families intentionally sought out,
and benefitted from, nonadversarial alternatives, for reasons that go well beyond the
extraordinary expense of traditional representation.
81. Separation and Divorce Services, CTR. FOR OUT-OF-CT. DIVORCE,
http://centerforoutofcourtdivorce.org/services/ [https://perma.cc/V9CA-LRMK] (last visited
Mar. 15, 2018). The legal education component is described as helping couples to
[i]dentify marital vs. separate assets and debt; [a]llocate marital assets and debt
equitably between the parties; [d]etermine gross monthly incomes; [i]dentify which
child-related expenses should be considered when calculating child support;
[r]eview the Colorado child support guidelines to determine the recommended child
support number; [r]eview the Colorado advisory maintenance guidelines concerning
a monthly maintenance amount (formerly known as alimony) and duration; [and
d]eliver a plan for moving forward as two separate households.
Emily Hastings, Navigating the Legal Transaction of Divorce, CTR. FOR OUT-OF-CT. DIVORCE
(Sept.
23,
2016),
http://centerforoutofcourtdivorce.org/blog/video-navigating-legaltransaction-divorce/ [https://perma.cc/XNK7-HZC2].
82. Emily Hastings, Understanding the Out-of-Court Divorce Model: Part Two, CTR. FOR
OUT-OF-CT. DIVORCE (Jan. 31, 2017), http://centerforoutofcourtdivorce.org/blog/
understanding-court-model-part-two/ [https://perma.cc/5DXX-RSUC]; see Andrew Schepard
& Rebecca Kourlis, Redefining Access to Justice for Separating and Divorcing Families, DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Spring 2016, at 22, 25 (observing that “[t]his is, to our knowledge, the first time
in American history that a required judicial hearing approving a couple’s final divorce has
been held outside a courthouse”).
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families were able to complete the dissolution process within ninety to 120
days.83 The fee for a “comprehensive transition package” was $6500, an
amount that is simultaneously minute in comparison to traditional legal fees
and yet utterly out of reach for a great many families.84
Of the parents who participated in the first two years of the program, 40.6
percent had an undergraduate degree and an additional 26.9 percent had also
obtained a graduate degree, combining for an astonishing majority with
significant educational attainment.85 As for income, 41 percent of the parents
participating had individual annual incomes above $56,000.86 Twenty-three
percent of all participating parents, in fact, reported individual annual
incomes above $76,000.87 These figures bedevil customary assumptions
about access to justice because they suggest that family law litigants who can
afford to fund their preferences want out of the courthouse.88 Scholars who
study the lawyer-client relationship have long understood that lawyers shape
the behavior of clients rather than just reflecting preexisting client
preferences.89 The remarkable insight that emerges from the family court
context is that prospective clients understand that dynamic, and many of them
want to avoid the siren song. One of the COCD clients, reflecting on her
experience, explained why she thought that not having a lawyer was actually
a benefit in arriving at a satisfactory resolution of her divorce: “During the
division of the assets, when I came out thinking I was paying more—and I
was, but that’s what was fair and equitable—it was important that I didn’t
have somebody in my corner egging me on to fight,” she said. “I could see
where this could get ugly if we were in court and represented by people
batting for us, rather than having two people who were advocates for both of
us and for the family,” she continued.90
Family court reform promotes access to justice, but it is a new kind of
access to justice. It overlaps substantially with the goals of delivering
meaningful “demand-side reform” to low- and middle-income litigants to
ameliorate the unfairness of being priced out of the market for legal services,
83. G.M. Filisko, Model Program Brings Holistic Solutions to Divorce, A.B.A. J. (Feb.
2015),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/model_program_brings_holistic_
solutions_to_divorce [https://perma.cc/Q23Q-XYPL].
84. Separation or Divorce Support Services, CTR. FOR OUT-OF-CT. DIVORCE,
http://centerforoutofcourtdivorce.org/services/comprehensive-transition-support/
[https://perma.cc/T3HW-8YP2] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (listing the various services
provided for the comprehensive $6500 family fee).
85. See CORNETT ET AL., supra note 14, at 16.
86. Id. at 16–17.
87. Id.
88. See id. One testimonial reported that the out-of-court divorce process was a good fit
because, “[a]s people who are relatively law abiding, the thought of going into the courthouse
and sitting in front of the judge just feels terrifying.” J.P., Testimonials and Reviews, CTR. FOR
OUT-OF-CT.
DIVORCE,
http://centerforoutofcourtdivorce.org/about-us/testimonials/
[https://perma.cc/2MSJ-HTDB] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
89. Katherine R. Kruse, Engaged Client-Centered Representation of the Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 577, 587 (2011) (noting
that “clients do not arrive with static and pre-determined objectives to which lawyers can
simply defer”).
90. See Filisko, supra note 83.
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but it also advances goals that are not born out of economic necessity, that
are driven by a much more extensive and complex set of ambitions. The
difficulty is not so much in accepting that these reforms promote access-tojustice values but in assessing whether they offer any insight into other areas
of law. It is that to which we briefly turn next.
II. CAN FAMILY COURT REFORM OFFER
INSIGHT FOR OTHER CONTEXTS?
We must start with the recognition that family law is exceptional in some
truly significant ways, including the field’s central and most pressing charge
to protect the interests of children. One of the reasons divorcing spouses
might deem it in their interest to work collaboratively to unwind their
marriage is that their definition of self-interest includes the well-being of
their children. The well-being of children, in turn, rests on their parents’
ability to minimize conflict during the divorce proceeding and to coparent
effectively afterwards.91 Other areas of law might also involve litigants who
will need to be able to work together or coexist relatively peacefully after the
conclusion of their dispute, including disputes pertaining to employment,
landlord-tenant relations, and small business partnerships. None of these
other areas, however, present the same concerns about vulnerable, dependent,
unrepresented third parties being caught at the center of the dispute, and it is
difficult to find any persuasive analogue for postdivorce coparenting: a
dissolution proceeding involving children restructures but does not truly end
the parents’ relationship to one another.
Nor is concern for children’s interests the only material difference that
emerges when comparing family law to other regimes. One of the
foundational principles in the law of marital property is the rule that labor
performed during marriage is marital labor, and the fruit of marital labor
belongs to the marital estate rather than to the individual laboring spouse.92
Moreover, except for gifts and inheritances, all property acquired during
marriage is marital.93 This means that when divorcing couples drive up the
transaction costs of their dissolution, they are depleting the very pot of assets
for which they are seeking to obtain a favorable distribution.94 The unique
interdependent and fiduciary relationship between divorcing spouses is

91. See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Postdivorce Family:
Implications of a Paradigm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 363, 363 (2009) (“[S]ocial science
suggests that children’s adjustment to divorce and separation depends significantly on their
parents’ behavior during and after the separation process: the higher the levels of parental
conflict to which children are exposed, the more negative the effects of family dissolution.”).
92. Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 752 A.2d 291, 302–06 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000)
(holding that the increase in the value of stock acquired by a spouse prior to the marriage was
marital property because the increase was the result of the spouse’s efforts during the
marriage); see Brett R. Turner, Active Appreciation: Second-Tier Managers, 22 EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION J. 1, 1 (2005) (“Equitable distribution theory provides that all value created
during the marriage by the active efforts of one or both spouses constitutes marital property.”).
93. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 27, § 4.03.
94. I have detailed this phenomenon in earlier work. See Aviel, supra note 3, at 1110–11.
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reflected and reinforced by a growing trend of mandatory mutual financial
disclosures that diverge significantly from other forms of civil discovery.95
With regard to both their children and their assets, then, divorcing spouses
have incentives to cooperate that other litigants might not have.
However, some of what is exceptional about family law cuts in the other
direction, meaning that it does not necessarily promote collaborative
problem-solving approaches. As anyone who has ever lived in a family or
known one can attest, the emotional valence that attends family disputes
sometimes lends itself all too well to an adversarial posture and the kind of
conflict that is not constrained by rational self-interest. We want to be careful
not to romanticize family court as some sort of mystical terrain of alternative
dispute resolution where people are uniquely inclined to work collaboratively
and forgo opportunities for aggressive adversarial process. While this Article
does not go so far as to treat “amicable divorce” as one of the “great
oxymorons” of family law,96 it notes the wry observation here because it is a
useful reminder that divorcing spouses who choose to work collaboratively
to unwind their marriage may be overcoming a great deal of anger,
resentment, betrayal, and antagonism to leverage their shared interest in
avoiding litigation.
Perhaps most importantly, in assessing whether the reforms reshaping
family court might yield insights for other contexts, we need to emphasize
that speed and cost are among the interests that family litigants repeatedly
and overwhelmingly invoke as among their highest priorities.97 Domesticrelations litigants are willing to knowingly and voluntarily forgo the
opportunity to deploy doctrinal principles that might increase their take in
return for a faster, smoother, more certain resolution. To provide one
example, the statutes that govern the distribution of marital property typically
instruct that among the factors courts should take into account in arriving at
an equitable allocation is the contribution of each party to the marital estate.98
One can readily see how spouses might litigate the issue of contribution to
increase their share, introducing evidence to substantiate the claim that their
contribution was more than 50 percent and that it would thus be equitable to
award them more than half of the marital property. Every divorcing spouse
who agrees to an equal distribution of marital property under such a scheme
is waiving the opportunity to persuade the court that their particular
circumstances warrant more than half of the assets. As noted throughout,

95. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 16.2(e) (“Parties to domestic relations cases owe each other
and the court a duty of full and honest disclosure of all facts that materially affect their rights
and interests and those of the children involved in the case. The court requires that, in the
discharge of this duty, a party must affirmatively disclose all information that is material to
the resolution of the case without awaiting inquiry from the other party. This disclosure shall
be conducted in accord with the duty of candor owing among those whose domestic issues are
to be resolved under this Rule 16.2.”).
96. See Patrick L. Baude, One Lawyer for the Family: A Response to Alysa Rollock, 73
IND. L.J. 601, 603 (1998).
97. See, e.g., Munro et al., supra note 21, at 440–41.
98. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 1973)
(alternative B).
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there are very good reasons for divorcing spouses to do that. The point is
that family litigants, for all their other specialized qualities, face a tension
between efficiency and individualized justice that is commonly present in
other contexts as well.
With this very summary comparison as a backdrop, what might we then
emphasize in thinking about how family court reform could transfer to other
contexts? This Article offers a few preliminary thoughts. First, the
transformation taking place in family court is not in any way a replacement
regime.99 Not only does the system still offer a traditional, adversarial
resolution of financial and custodial issues, but either party can demand it.
To put the point in reverse, only when both parties agree to simplified
dissolution or early resolution do these programs initialize. While this means
that there will inevitably be some loss of efficiency, when a party irrationally
vetoes one of these alternatives under circumstances in which it would be
optimal, that element of mutual consent seems like an important attribute of
reform that is access enhancing rather than access inhibiting.
Second, and closely related, the procedural reforms of the post-no-fault era
have not changed the substantive entitlements. As noted above, the law
casting a shadow over a couple’s divorce negotiation still identifies
contribution as an element in marital property distribution. The entitlement
that confers—however unpredictable and indeterminate—is still available to
spouses who choose to pursue it. Divorcing spouses waive out of these
principles on the basis of a calculation of self-interest, as bounded and
defined by the family relationships that are being restructured. Those who
choose not to waive the right to invoke such principles are under no
compulsion to do so.100
That brings us to the last and most important insight: “fit the forum to the
fuss,” that hoary adage of alternative dispute resolution, is an internal
command.101 In trying to “expedite, streamline, and rationalize,”102 it is not
sufficient, and can in fact be terribly inapt, to think about categories of like
cases—whether it be divorce, landlord-tenant, or otherwise—and then to
design a set of procedures that applies inflexibly to all the cases within.103
The cases on either side of the domestic-relations spectrum, although they
will each result in judgments of dissolution resolving the couple’s financial
affairs, hardly resemble each other. On one end are couples with brief
marriages, few assets, and no kids, who literally do not have to show up,
99. Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from the
VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1640 (2015) (defining a “replacement regime” as one that
displaces and makes unavailable prior systems).
100. Although they will, of course, still face the difficulty of affording the high costs of
legal representation to meaningfully litigate these issues, which this Article acknowledges is
itself a coercive dynamic.
101. See generally Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the
Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994).
102. Engstrom, supra note 99, at 1636.
103. See Jason Parkin, Due Process Disaggregation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 285
(2014) (describing “identifiable clusters of individuals in a particular context whose
procedural needs are different from those of the majority”).
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bringing new meaning to the term “mailing it in.” On the other end of the
spectrum, we might have any number of different circumstances. If one
parent is accusing the other of intimate partner violence, there may be civil
protection orders pending and a collateral criminal proceeding awaiting
resolution. Child welfare agencies may be involved if there are concerns that
the children are at risk for abuse or neglect. Perhaps the couple owns a
business together that will require a professional valuation prior to partition.
There may be immigration issues triggering consequences under federal
law.104 The possibilities for conflict and complexity abound, as they can in
any context that involves human relationships.
What the new family court can teach the rest of the world is that
simplification is an essential component of access-enhancing reforms but that
not all cases are amenable to it, and that systems must be designed around
that recognition. We must judge the system on how well it differentiates,
rather than treating the complex and challenging cases as some sort of
unexpected anomaly that prevents the system from achieving its goals.105

104. See generally De Guardado v. Guardado Menjivar, 901 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. Ct. App.
2017).
105. See generally Richard Zorza, The Access to Justice “Sorting Hat”: Towards a System
of Triage and Intake That Maximizes Access and Outcomes, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 859 (2012).

